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The principle of secularity defines the traditional position of the French republic in the debate 
on multiculturalism. For now, we can briefly define this position as a position of critique (in 
principle  based on the defence of equality of individual  rights), which would ideally tend 
towards what some have described as a “politics of indifference” (Kukathas 2003, 15). We 
will first see how secularity has directed the policies and the general ideology of the French 
Republic  towards  immigration,  and  how,  in  spite  of  this  traditional  position,  the  current 
discourse on immigration, national identity and belonging makes use of statistics to promote 
the representation and the recognition of social groups for political purposes. The question of 
how these discourses benefit  from the general political  backlash (especially in the case of 
immigration) of multiculturalism is not addressed in this paper. Another question which is left 
out, and which would need to be addressed to better measure the onslaught on republican 
principles  is  the  effects  of  colonialism on the  categories  and the questions  related  to  the 
phenomenological multiculturalism of French society.
I say phenomenological here as multiculturalism is a loaded concept and can either be defined 
phenomenologically,  i.e.  the factual  cultural  diversity of a given society,  or ideologically, 
referring thus to the politics of recognition rather than the politics of indifference. That means 
that French society is multicultural whereas France is not – at least not usually – associated 
with multicultural  politics – this time in the ideological sense. And yet,  there are policies 
addressing  multicultural  issues  and  they  are  founded,  at  least  in  part,  on  the  republican 
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principle of secularity which emerged in political debates on the relation between Church and 
State  and Church and society during the French revolution.  But it  is  not  before the third 
Republic and a series of acts that the secularity of the Republic will be institutionalised with 
the terminology we use today.  The famous 1905 law on the separation of Church and State 
can be considered the conclusive act of a series which have rendered this institutionalisation 
effective (Levillain, 2005). What is important to note here is that on the long run, the debates 
on secularity have lead to, across different states, a separation of power, between the temporal 
and the spiritual to use old fashioned categories,  reducing in effect the political  power of 
religious institutions  and aiming at  a form of autonomy for political,  temporal  institutions 
from the spiritual affairs. It is important to bear in mind that we are not talking about any state 
and any church. We are talking about the French Jacobin Republic with a strong current of 
anticlerical  ideology  and  we  are  talking  about  the  Roman  Catholic  Church.  This 
institutionalisation  of  secularity  can  be  considered,  in  this  perspective,  as  the  result  of  a 
philosophical  and  political  struggle  to  change  the  hierarchy  in  society,  placing  religious 
beliefs  in  the  private  realm  and  stripping  religious  institutions  of  their  central  (cultural) 
traditional position. I’m going to leave out the genealogy or the history of this struggle which 
would take us back to the Reform and beyond to focus now on how this formation of the 
principle of secularity frames the current debates on immigration. What this sketchy overview 
brings out, is the importance of religion in the traditional debates on diversity which have 
traditionally  been  framed  as  questions  of  the  pacification  of  religious  struggles  and  the 
historical answers have taken the form of a secularisation of society, based on the ideas of 
toleration and the recognition of freedom of conscience and association (Song, 2010). The 
two logical  conclusions  which  stem from these  ideas  are  1.  the  neutrality  of  the  state  in 
religious affairs and 2. the defence of individual rights to form and leave associations. The 
anticlerical and rational argument for the reason behind the French principle of secularity can 
be formulated as state protection for individuals against religious proselytism conceived as 
group pressure. As a follow-up, the politics of recognition – meaning group recognition -, 
appears as incompatible with these ideas. This provides us with a short explanation for the 
traditional opposition of French political thought to ideological multiculturalism.   
Now how does this relate to statistics, and more particularly to ethnic statistics? In accordance 
with the set of principles presented above (and their derivatives), the state has to ensure an 
equality of treatment. The answer to ensure such equality of treatment is to be found in the 
politics  of  indifference,  which,  to  avoid  any form of  discrimination,  do not  make use  of 
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categories which would recognise any other belonging that that to the French republic. Thus, 
the official statistics do not include the so called “sensitive questions” (Simon, 2007) related 
to ethnicity, race and religion as these aspects are not part of the public sphere, at least  de 
jure. We can note that this approach affects applications of policies of positive discrimination 
as  well.  So what  are  the  categories  used  for  gathering  statistics  of  an  “ethnic”  nature  in 
France? They are based on the distinction between nationals and foreigners, and take into 
account elements such as the place of birth and the different ways of obtaining nationality to 
refine  the  data.  In  this  set  of  categories,  an  immigrant  is  not  necessarily  a  foreigner  and 
reversely,  a  foreigner  is  simply  defined  as  a  non-national,  whereas,  a  national  can  be 
considered an immigrant (e.g. if born a non-national abroad and having obtained nationality 
later). These distinctions, however refined, are limited and do not allow, unless stretched, to 
associate the census data sets with socio-economic categories for instance. 
This brings us to the recent debate and discourses on national identity and immigration in 
France. As a core political issue, this association has been brought by Nicolas Sarkozy during 
the 2007 presidential campaign. In the follow-up of his election as President of the Republic, 
Sarkozy created a ministry which short name was the ministry for immigration and national 
identity. The rationale behind this association, introduced a number of rather odd assumptions 
given  the  background  I’ve  sketched  out  above.  These  included  statements  that 
multiculturalism  has  failed,  that  the  French  integration  system  has  failed,  and  that 
immigration is out of control and that the pressure of immigration is the reason behind the 
cultural and economic problems faced by the French society. The main reason behind this to 
be found, according to Sarkozy, in the lack of promotion of French national identity:  “We 
have forgotten to speak about France” would he say during the campaign. Taking on this 
rationale,  the  first  minister  to  the  ministry  for  immigration  and  national  identity,  Brice 
Hortefeux, would certify this assessment adding a dash of statistics to the demonstration: 
“First of all, let us be honest: the French integration system has failed. The proof 
is the much too high concentration of population of foreign origin in only three 
regions out of 22:  60% of foreigners live in Ile-de-France,  Rhône-Alpes or in 
PACA,  sometimes  in  real  urban  ghettos.  Another  proof  is  the  average 
unemployment  rate  of  foreigners,  above  20%,  which  is  more  than  twice  the 
national average. In certain “banlieues”, this rate reaches to 40%. We have to say 
the truth to the French people: our integration system is not a model anymore. 
And to successfully integrate, one has first to control immigration.” (November 
2007) 
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If we refer back to the definitions of the categories used in official statistics, it is not very 
clear what Hortefeux is saying as “population of foreign origin” can refer to a certain number 
of different situations, and it is unclear how living in one of the three main urban areas in a 
proof of a failure of the system. What we could learn from such statistics is that immigrant 
nationals tend to stay in urban areas, which is benign information and shouldn’t come as a 
surprise. Now, if we turn to the second “proof”, we realise that the terminology has changed. 
We are now talking about foreigners and unemployment rates. In a report of the National 
institute of statistics and economic studies from 2009, we can indeed read that this figure is 
close to reality. To what extent this tells us that the integration system has failed is not clear 
again, as this could as easily be interpreted as a form of discrimination towards employment, 
and represent a failure of the economic integration of foreigners effectively preventing an 
ideal integration. The reference to the housing estates could not be verified, and one should 
wonder why such a stigmatisation? The theme of the banlieues has been a recurrent theme for 
defining the internal other for Sarkozy, as Interior minister and as President, and Hortefeux 
seems here to be simply picking up the trail of further marginalising already marginalised 
components of French society. What we observe in fact is that essentially, the statistics in this 
context are meaningless and appear to serve as pseudo-rational arguments, a sophistication to 
avoid argumentation, which aim at presenting the final statement on the necessity of changing 
immigration policies as self-evident. The result has been the institution of policies based on 
target figures, such as the number of expulsions. 
The ministry was reformed in late 2010 and clouded in the same discourses; its prerogatives 
are now part of the ministry of the Interior. The current minister, Claude Guéant, has already 
shone as having misinterpreted official statistics for ideological reasons, when he would assert 
during an radio interview in May last year that 2/3 of the children failing in the educational 
system were children of immigrants.  The statement was false to the point that the INSEE 
released  a  communiqué to  correct  the  minister  stating  that  an estimated  16% of  children 
leaving  the  secondary  education  system without  qualification  are  children  of  immigrants, 
which does not necessarily mean foreigners as we know, but means of parents born outside of 
France. In a speech dating from the 10 January this year, the minister gave a detailed account 
of how efficient has the policy of target figures been under his mandate. The sense of the 
politics of immigration is described as follows: 
“The sense of our policy is a certain conception of France and of French society. 
We wish for France to remain faithful to its great republican principles, such as 
secularity and equality between men and women. We refuse communatarianisms, 
the secluded life of ethnic or religious communities which follow their own rules 
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which  are  not  those  of  the  Republic  neither  of  France.  In  consequence,  the 
foreigners we welcome have to integrate. It is they who have to integrate and not 
the other way round.”
The speech is riddled with detailed figures of expulsions, of the reduction of visas etc.  It 
would take too long to explain here, but in sum, what we learn if we take the time to analyse 
the  figures  Guéant  provides  is  that  everything  is  set  to  meet  the  new  target  figure  of 
expulsions  in 2012 of 35,000 expulsions:  the reduction of the number of visas and work 
permits, the reduction of naturalisations, the increase of the fees for obtaining a visa, etc. 
We  finally  start  rounding  up  to  the  principle  of  secularity…  Here,  as  in  many  other 
occurrences, a government official stresses the importance of secularity and transgresses its 
bounds directly afterwards. If we realign the resurgence of religion on the political scene, the 
transgression of the neutrality of the state in such affairs has become a common feature in the 
secular  republic  of  France.  The  cultural  stigmatisation  of  foreigners  and  immigrant 
populations,  the culturalist  and religious  definition  of national  identity and the politics  of 
target  figures  have  all  come  together  and  have  for  effect  to  undermine  the  principle  of 
secularity of the French state. One could of course argue, with reason, that the traditional 
politics  of  indifference  have  failed  to  tackle  the  problems  of  economic  integration  and 
discrimination and would certainly need to be reassessed in the light of the actual diversity of 
French  society.  The  development,  in  political  discourse,  of  a  restricted,  traditionalist 
definition of national identity,  coupled with a marginalisation of French citizens of foreign 
origin  and  of  immigrants  more  generally,  of  Muslims  in  particular,  points  towards  a 
weakening  of  the  republican  cultural  and  political  institutions  in  France.  Is  this  simply 
electoral politics playing with fire or the symptoms of a deeper cultural reaction? 
 
5
References
Donzelot, J., 2006, Quand la ville se défait : Quelle politique face à la crise des banlieues, Paris, 
Éditions du Seuil.
Fassin, D., & E. Fassin (eds.), 2009, De la question sociale à la question raciale: représenter la 
société française, Paris, La Découverte.
Kukathas, C., 2003, The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of Diversity and Freedom, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press\
Levillain, P., 2005, « Les débats au début de la IIIe République », La laïcité : des débats, une histoire, 
un avenir (1789 - 2005), Actes du colloque organisé sous le haut patronage de M. Christian Poncelet, 
Président du Sénat, en partenariat avec le Comité d'Histoire Parlementaire et Politique le vendredi 4 
février 2005, Paris, Palais du Luxembourg
Paquot, T., 2007, « Politiques de la ville », Projet 4, n° 299, p. 16-23.
Sayegh, P.-Y., 2008, “Discursive Elements in the (De)Banalization of Nationalism. A Study of 
Speeches by Gordon Brown and Nicolas Sarkozy”, CFE Working Papers Series No. 35, Sweden
Simon, P., 2007, “’Ethnic’ statistics and data protection in the Council of Europe countries, Study 
Report”, Council of Europe
Song, S., 2010, "Multiculturalism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2010 Edition), 
Edward N. Zalta (ed.)
Taylor, C. & A. Gutmann (eds.), 1992, Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition: An Essay, 
Princeton, Princeton University Press.
Weil, P., 1991, La France et ses étrangers: l’aventure d’une politique de l’immigration, 1938-1991, 
Paris, Calmann-Levy.
6
